Focusing only on these particular price and wage series gives policy makers, citizens and workers an incomplete picture because the choice of price deflator makes a big difference. Most economists believe that the CPI includes upward biases which compound significantly over time (See Hausman [2003] and Broda and Weinstein [2008] for a summary). Overstating price growth mechanically implies understating real wage growth (Costa 2001 , Hamilton 1998 and Klenow 2003 .
In the first part of this descriptive paper I consider growth in household consumption for households with below median income. The pessimistic narrative on real wages is somewhat at odds with casual empiricism about material goods consumption. If you spend time working with high school students, you notice that even in low income areas, many of the students have cell phones and have access to cable TV and internet service at home. Access to these powerful and modern tools suggests that low income families have seen important gains in at least some areas of consumption. The quality and variety of home appliances and electronics (TVs) in the average home is surely vastly superior to what people owned in the 1970s. American homes have become more spacious and cars are both higher quality and there are more cars per family.
Measuring consumption formally in the Census, the American Housing Survey and the Consumer Expenditure Survey confirms these casual observations. Among all households with below median incomes, the number of cars per household has risen from 1 to 1.6 during 1970-2015. And median square footage in these families' homes has risen about 8%. Consider consumption measured in 2015 dollars among two person households with below median income. I find a 62 percent increase in consumption during 1960 to 2015. This calculation uses the CPI and does not fully include increases in the quality of goods and services. After adjusting 3 CPI for the bias estimated by Hamilton (1998) and Costa (2001) , I calculate a 164% increase in consumption for these households.
In the second part of the paper, I calculate real wages using either the Fed's preferred inflation measure of PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditures) or using simple adjustments to CPI using magnitudes suggested by the Boskin commission (Boskin et al 1996) and Costa (2001) . This adjustment reverses the finding of wage stagnation. Using the PCE to deflate nominal wages suggests real wage growth of 24 percent from 1975-2015 or about .54% growth in real wages per year. That growth is significantly less than the 1.18% annual growth in real wages (using PCE inflation) seen in the earlier decade [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] and is significantly less than GDP per capita growth of 1.8 percent over the 1975-2015 period. But 24 percent growth from 1975-2015 is substantially better than zero growth and the PCE inflation could itself still contain upward bias. Adjusting for the Hamilton (1998) and Costa (2001) estimates of CPI bias implies real wage growth of 1 percent per year during 1975-2015 and GDP per capita growth of 2.7 percent per year. My de-biased estimates of real wage growth are quite similar to those obtained by Broda and Weinstein [2008] using an individual goods based approach to estimate CPI bias.
Relation to Prior Literature
Economists and other social scientists have performed in depth analyses documenting the rise in income inequality in the past 30 years. See Piketty and Saez (2003) and Piketty (2014) . A number of authors have pointed out that accounting for tax law changes (Slemrod 1995), household size and filing status, and transfers (Burkhauser, Feng, Jenkins, and Larrimore (2012) somewhat alters the measured increase in inequality over time.
Several authors including Aguiar and Bils (2015) , Krueger and Perri (2007) and Attanasio Battistin and Ichimura (2004) point out that growth in consumption inequality has not been as severe as the growth in income inequality. Transfers, taxation, consumption smoothing, and changing household composition can all cause a divergence between income inequality changes and consumption inequality changes.
Fewer papers address whether levels of income, wages, consumption and well-being are rising in absolute terms over time for the non-rich. This is an equally important but even harder question to answer. Costa (2001), Broda and Weinstein (2008) and Meyer and Sullivan (2012) are among the best such papers. The latter calculates consumption based measures of poverty rates and how these have evolved over time. Meyer and Sullivan show that consumption based poverty measures have been falling since 1982 even as official income based poverty measures are relatively flat. They note that one issue with the income based poverty measure is the exclusion of transfers and taxation from income and a second issue is the use of potentially upward biased 4 CPI-U to deflate income. 4 Unlike Meyer and Sullivan I focus directly on growth rates in consumption for the non-rich as opposed to changes in poverty rates. 5 But the basic points about the importance de-biasing price indices and how this changes our view of improvements in living standards are the same.
Questions on the level of consumption are difficult because this requires some comparison of prices, quality, and good availability over time. The iPhone of today has more computing power than a 1990s mainframe computer. But is a poor person with an iPhone richer than a person who owned a mainframe 25 years ago?
A very thoughtful literature addresses the possible problems with the CPI price index, including the size and sources of the biases, possible solutions, and most importantly implications for calculating real income growth. The Boskin Commision (1996) parsed the upward biases in CPI into 1) new goods bias: failure to quickly incorporate new goods, 2) product quality bias: failure to account for growth in product and service quality, 3) outlet bias: failure to incorporate availability of new less expensive outlets e.g. Wal-Mart, Best Buy or Amazon, and 4) substitution bias i.e. failure to account for consumer's ability to substitute away from more goods or services that become relative more expensive.
Hausman (2003) The Hamilton (1998) technique of calculating CPI bias is ingenious in that it only requires a modest number of data inputs. Hamilton's insight is that food's share of the household budget over time should depend only upon income and the price of food relative to all other goods. If incomes are not rising, changes in food's budget share should be attributable to changes in the relative cost of food. In reality, PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) data show food's budget share falling over time even holding the relative price of food and CPI adjusted income constant. This is a strong indication that the CPI is over adjusting and that true real incomes are indeed rising. It is easy to calculate the CPI bias as that adjustment to CPI needed to explain the difference between true food budget share and predicted food budget share. 1972-1994 and .6% from 1982-1994 . I extend these results to 2015 and find smaller CPI bias in the most recent twenty years.
I make several contributions. First I extend the existing work to 2015. Second, I focus on the lower half of the income distribution by examining real hourly wages and consumption for families with below median income. Third I show time series for physical measures of consumption such autos and square footage of homes.
Results
I begin with a series of calculations about growth in consumption for below median households. This implies almost a doubling in vehicles per household. Importantly the quality, reliability, safety and gas mileage of these vehicles have also improved immensely. For example, the average vehicle in operation in 1969 was 5.1 years old whereas in 2014 the average vehicle in operation was 11.4 years old. This is likely not because people in 2014 are so poor that they are forced to drive old cars, but rather that modern cars simply last much longer and are probably more reliable even given this extended product life.
In Figure shows these same facts but using American Housing Survey data instead of Census data. Figure  5 switches to bathrooms per household and uses data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. Bathrooms per household grow by about 50 percent during 1986-2015 for families with below median income.
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Using American Housing Survey data, I calculate growth in median square feet of homes. For families below median income, square footage has risen from 1200 square feet to 1300 square feet from 1993 to 2009. This is 8 percent overall growth. Families above median incomes experienced growth of 13 percent during this same time period. This is consistent with my hypothesis that there has been consumption growth for both rich and non-rich families though the rich have seen larger increases.
Given the problems with making price adjustments over long periods of time, I prefer the above physical quantity measures of consumption over dollars of consumption. However, I only have these few limited items for which I know quantities consumed over time.
Given this limitation, I now turn to dollar based measures of consumption in the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). I inflate CEX consumption measures to 2015 dollars using both standard CPI and CPI as de-biased using the Hamilton (1998)/ Costa (2001) consumption (for below median households) to 1 percent per year. This is certainly less than annual GDP growth of 1.8 percent, though still meaningful growth in consumption.
Column 3 measures total spending on basic needs of food, housing, clothing, healthcare and utilities. Price adjustment is performed using the individual CPI components as published (without de-biasing). Again we see 1 percent annual growth in consumption averaged over the whole time period of 1960-2015. Not surprisingly expenditures on food and apparel in columns 5 and 6 grew less rapidly than overall consumption. Food's falling budget share is consistent with increases in real incomes for these households and or possibly relative changes in prices (for food and apparel) that are not fully captured by CPI component indices.
The steady growth I observe in consumption for below median income households (quantity based and dollar based) is at odds with the pessimistic picture of wages presented in Figure 1 . Likely many explanations are at work for this divergence including the increased prevalence of two earner families, increases in transfer payments or increases in the progressivity of taxes.
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One candidate explanation is that real wages were in fact growing during 1975-2015 and that our standard CPI price adjustment is hiding this growth.
In Figure 1 , real wages fall substantially from 1975 until 1995 and then recover during 1996-2015. Figure 6 shows that this picture changes quite a bit under three alterative sets of price inflators. The green line uses the Federal Reserve's preferred measure of the Personal Consumption Expenditures price index. The main difference between this index and the CPI is that PCE contains some additional components of consumption but more importantly PCE weights the components by total consumption of that good or service in the economy. This allows for substitution across goods to influence the overall price level change.
The red line represents real wages assuming that CPI growth is always overstated by 20 percent. There is no theoretical justification for the choice of 20 percent but many estimates of CPI bias tend to be in the range of 20 percent of CPI's growth. Assuming that CPI is off by a relative amount rather than a fixed percentage point amount seems appealing particularly in the current era of low inflation.
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The orange line represents real wages where the CPI has been corrected for the bias measured in the Hamilton (1998) and Costa (2001) Table 3 shows estimates of annualized growth rates in wages by decade. The first column shows growth in real wages using CPI deflation. This column show real wages fell by 0.8 percent per year during the ten years January 1975-January 1985 and fell by 0.6 percent per year during the ten years ended in 1995. 10 In the subsequent two decades wage growth is positive 0.8 percent per year and 0.7 percent per year respectively.
The next three columns calculate growth in real wages using a) PCE adjustment, b) an assumption of 20% upward bias in CPI growth, and c) Hamilton/ Costa adjustment to CPI. The picture looks progressively more optimistic as we move from left to right. PCE adjustment still has negative wage growth in the first two decades (75-85 and 85-95) but the decreases in real wages are smaller. Hamilton/ Costa bias adjustment implies annual real wage growth of 1.4% during 1975-1985, .2 percent per year during 1985-1995, 1.4 percent during 1995-2005 and .8 percent in the most recent decade.
Concluding Remarks
Consumption for below median income families has seen steady progress since 1960. My preferred point estimates are based on CEX measures of consumption where the price index has been de-biased following Hamilton and Costa. These estimates suggest that consumption is up 1.7 percent per year or 164 percent over the whole time period. These estimates of growth strike me as consistent with the significant increases in quality and quantity of goods enjoyed by Americans over the last half century. And my conclusions are consistent with the findings of Broda and Weinstein (2008) . Estimates of slow and steady growth seem more plausible than media headlines which suggest that median American households face declining living standards.
The bias adjusted estimates also provide a more positive outlook on real wage growth in the last 40 years than standard media headlines. PCE adjusted wages appear to have grown at .5% per year during 1975-2015 while the de-biased CPI adjusted wages grew at 1% per year over the same time period.
Importantly these estimates do not tell us anything about why wages grew more slowly than GDP or why inequality increased. CPI bias does not explain decreases in labor's share of income (Krueger 1999) or the associated rise in inequality (Pikkety and Saez 2003) . Adjusting the price index downward leads to higher estimated real wage growth and higher estimated real GDP growth.
What I do not address here is why Americans feel worse off if consumption is actually rising. There are at least four important explanations that may be at work. First, I am only examining consumption within very large sections of the income distribution and there may be specific groups (for example less than high school educated men) for whom consumption is actually falling. Second, it's possible that the quality of some services such as public education or health care could be falling for some groups. Third, the rise in income inequality coupled with increased information flow about other people's consumption may be making Americans feel worse off in a relative sense even if their material goods consumption is rising. Fourth, changes in family structure (e.g. the rise of single parent households), increases in the prison population, or increases in substance addiction could make people worse off even in the face of rising material wealth. A deep future research agenda would be to understand how America has lost its sense of optimism about living standards and whether the problem is one of consumption, relative consumption (relative to other people) or something entirely different. Mechanically that means that 2015 data point will be the same for all series but that the bias corrected real wages in earlier years are lower ; those wages truly were lower in real terms than suggested by standard CPI adjustment if standard CPI adjustment was inflating them too much.
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Lines from top to bottom are: wages deflated by CPI (blue line), deflated by PCE (green line), deflated assuming CPI 20% overstated (red line), deflated assuming Hamilton/ Costa estimates of CPI bias (orange line) 
